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How Large Is the Underfunding Problem?
Population aging is putting retirement provision
under financial pressure. As a result, in the past decades the
United States has witnessed a trend away from defined benefit
(DB) towards defined contribution (DC) pension plans. The
public-sector pension plans that manage the pensions of state
civil servants, however, are an exception to this trend: these
plans still largely operate on a DB basis, even though it is clear
that the benefits promised to their participants cannot be honored
absent drastic measures to reduce the generosity of the plans or
raise the financial support from taxpayers. This article explores
the degree of underfunding of American state pension funds as
well as the effectiveness of various measures to alleviate this
potential burden on American taxpayers.
Table 1 summarizes the funding status of American public-
sector pension plans in 2012 (Munnell et al. 2013), based on
a sample of 109 state plans and 17 locally administered plans.1
The average funding ratio (assets / liabilities) is 73%. The
funding ratios are reported on the basis of GASB standards
that prescribe that assets be reported on an actuarially smoothed
basis, while the discount rate for the liabilities is typically set
at around 8%, reflecting the expected long-term investment
return on assets.
There is an ongoing debate on how funding ratios should be
measured, and what the appropriate funding target should be
(see, e.g., D’Arcy, Dulebohn, and Oh 1999; Bohn 2011; Lucas
and Zeldes 2009; Brown, Clark, and Rauh 2011). Brown et al.
(2011) assume that adequate funding means 100% funding. The
GASB standards have been criticized by financial economists
(Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009; Bader and Gold 2003) who argue
that future streams of benefit payments should be discounted at a
rate reflecting their degree of riskiness. As state and local pension
benefits are protected under most state laws, these payments can
be seen as guaranteed, which implies that future benefits must
be discounted at the risk-free interest rate. This discounting
would lead to a severe fall (around 30 percentage points) in
the already low average funding ratio of state and local plans.
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Most public-sector pension plans in the United States provide quite generous defined benefits.
Long-term projections show that full payment of these promises threatens the finances of
many state and local employers, which implies that taxes will have to be increased or pensions
and/or other public expenditures reduced. This article analyzes the effectiveness of measures
aimed at improving the sustainability of these plans. We consider the impact of contribution
increases, benefit reductions, and adjustments in the pension fund’s investment strategy.
Since a pension fund can be seen as a zero-sum game, these interventions imply value
redistributions among current and future plan participants and current and future tax
payers. We use the value-based asset–liability management (ALM) method to estimate the
value of those transfers. These imply massive value redistributions from taxpayers to plan
participants that could exceed 20% of American GDP. Hence, plan sustainability may be
achieved only through either substantially higher contributions or lower benefits.
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Table 1: Distribution of Funding Ratios of Public
Plans, 2012
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Policy Measures to Improve Financial
Sustainabil ity
Higher funding ratios can be achieved in three ways: higher
contributions, lower benefits, and higher investment returns.
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2014a) explore how much contributions
would need to be raised to reach full funding in 30 years’ time,
computing a necessary increase in public-sector employee
contributions on the order of 23% of pay. The option of reducing
benefits has long been seen as unfeasible, because in many states
public pensions are interpreted as hard contractual obligations,
protected by civil law and state constitutions (Monahan 2012);
recently, however, several states have been successful in scaling
back the generosity of pensions. Several plans have relaxed
the guaranteed character of benefits by suspending the cost-
of-living adjustment while still paying out accrued pension
promises as defined by the plan. Some plans have enacted
benefit cuts, as for example for city employees in Detroit.
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2014b) have explored performance-
linked indexation rules as an alternative to automatic cost-of-
living adjustments (COLA); they also suggest implementing
the conditional indexation rules of Dutch pension plans, which
link indexation to the financial position as measured by the
funding ratio (Beetsma and Bucciol 2011; Ponds and Van
Riel 2009). Shnitser (2013) stresses that simply scaling back
benefits or imposing higher contribution rates will not be
enough, claiming that institutional design must be reframed to
practices and rules that have proved successful in promoting
funding discipline.
A third route proposed to resolve funding deficits is to increase
investment returns. This option seems to be in use already,
as many American public-sector pension funds have higher
equity exposures than pension funds outside the United States
(Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers 2013; OECD 2011).
The Value-Based ALM Method
We assess the long-term financial sustainability of the American
public pension sector using the value-based asset–liability
management (ALM) method, which involves rewriting a
pension plan in terms of embedded options held by the fund’s
stakeholders (in this case, current and future plan members
and taxpayers). By providing a market-based valuation of all
cash flows associated with the pension contract, value-based
ALM decomposes the consequences of policy interventions
for the different stakeholders. Changes in the fair values of
the embedded options reveal value transfers between the
stakeholders. Policy changes are always a zero-sum game,
such that the total value of the contract to all stakeholders
together is unchanged and policy changes can only shift value
among groups of stakeholders. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first application of value-based ALM to the study of
reform-induced generational redistribution within American
state and local pension funds.
The value-based ALM approach has its roots in pioneering work
by Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) in using derivative pricing
to value contingent claims within pension funds (more recent
applications of derivative pricing to pension plans include Blake
1998; Chapman, Gordon, and Speed 2001; Ponds 2003; Bader
and Gold 2007; Hoevenaars and Ponds 2008; and Hoevenaars,
Kocken, and Ponds 2009). Biggs (2010) also uses an option-
based approach, but only to value the market price of pension
liabilities of American state pension plans; he does not discuss
reform plans and the resulting value redistribution among
stakeholders. Value-based ALM has been used by the Netherlands
Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB 2012) to investigate
the generational fairness of various Dutch pension reform plans.
Classic ALM studies use economic models to produce stochastic
simulations of returns on asset classes and other relevant
economic data, such as inflation. Scenario analyses result in
probability distributions for the key pension plan variables.
Sensitivity analysis is used to explore specific policy variants
with respect to asset mix, contribution policy, and indexation
rules; policy variants are evaluated in terms of expected values
and relevant risk measures for key variables (e.g., funding
ratio, contribution rate, or indexation rate). Value-based
ALM complements classic ALM, as the value-based approach
assigns a market value to the contingent claims of the various
stakeholders. By shifting from the baseline plan to another plan




In order to use the value-based ALM method to assess various
policy reform options for American state and local pension
plans, we created a single pension plan representing the aggregate
public pension plan sector in the United States, which reflects
the most common plan features in the sector as captured in
the Public Plans Database (PPD) of the Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College. We use the data from 2010, the
last year for which all the required data are reported.
The initial size of the plan participant population in 2010 is
24 million. As the database does not provide information on
the composition of the age cohorts, we have constructed the
composition of the participant structure from the current
American population and the survival probabilities from the
Society of Actuaries (SOA) Life Tables. The horizon of our
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projections is 75 years. The inflow of new entrants after the
twenty-fifth year (i.e., cohorts not born yet) is assumed to
follow the trend in the number of new entrants in the first
25 years, based on the cohorts aged 25 and younger in 2010
and their survival probabilities.
Our representative plan is a final-pay plan with a career wage–
age profile that is based on the United States and adapted from
Bucciol (2012). The accrual rate for each year of service is
2%. The first benefit payment is based on the average of wage
levels for the last three working years and on years of service
over the participant’s full career. Individuals enter the labor
market at age 25 and retire at age 65, so a full career translates
to 40 working years.
Valuation of pension fund assets and liabilities follows the
GASB standards, including the valuation of liabilities with the
assumed rate of return of 8%. The value of total liabilities in
2010, based on the entry-age normal costing (EAN) method,2
is calibrated by changing the absolute wage levels to match
the US$3.4 trillion level of liabilities reported in the PPD.
The funding ratio is 75%, and the assets under management
total US$2.8 trillion.
The actual contribution is set to 100% of the normal cost
(EAN method) plus 50% of the required amortization payment
in the case of a funding deficit. The amortization payment is
determined by spreading the unfunded liability amount in
equal annual payments over the next 30 years. In the case of
a funding surplus, the required amortization payment is fixed
at zero, so that the total contribution cannot fall below the
normal cost level (one-sided policy). The employee pays a
fixed 6% of his or her salary, while the employer pays the
remainder of the required contribution.
Possible Plan Reforms
We consider several variations on the baseline settings to
explore how different policy changes affect the contract
values of the various stakeholders. This gives us insights
into the effectiveness of different measures in increasing the
financial sustainability of the pension plan, as well as the
impact of these policy changes on the value of the various
stakeholders’ contingent claims. We consider three groups
of measures, which are summarized in Table 2. The baseline
plan is referred to as Plan 0.0.
1. Reform Plans 1.1–1.4 address variants in the contribution
rate. Plans 1.1 and 1.2 vary the fraction of the required
amortization payment actually paid; Plan 1.3 shortens the
period over which the amortization payment is spread; and
Plan 1.4 doubles participants’ contribution payment (from
6% to 12%), leaving the total contribution unchanged.
2. Reform Plans 2.1 and 2.2 address variants in the degree of
indexation.3 Plan 2.1 halves indexation when CPI inflation
is positive. Under Plan 2.2, indexation is conditional on the
funding ratio in a linear way: when CPI inflation is positive,
the degree of indexation is set at zero for funding ratios
below 50% and increases linearly with the funding ratio for
funding ratios ≥50%. A funding ratio above 100% implies
more than full indexation. This conditional indexation
method closely mirrors the way in which most Dutch
pension funds index their pension entitlements.
3. Reform Plans 3.1 and 3.2 address the composition of the
fund’s asset portfolio, which we vary from 0% to 100%
stocks. The baseline plan composition is 50% stocks and
50% bonds.
ALM Scenarios and Classic ALM Results
We evaluate the policy choices over 75 years, such that at the
end current stakeholders will have been replaced in full by new
stakeholders. The ALM scenarios are calibrated to data from
the United States. The economy features an annual average
stock return of 11.7%, an average 10-year Treasury bond return
of 6.3%, nominal wage growth of 5.7%, and price inflation of
3.7%; these figures are averages of all numbers generated for
all the scenarios (for more details see Lekniute et al. 2014).4
We first discuss the results of our baseline plan settings,
which reflect current practices of American state pension plans.
Tables 3 and 4 show the funding ratio (FR); the pension result
(PR), defined as the ratio of cumulative granted indexation to
cumulative 100% price indexation; and the total contribution
rate (c) for the baseline plan (column 2) and the various
reforms. The long-term projections show a large spread in
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1.1 0% amortization paid
1.2 100% amortization paid
1.3 Amortization spread over 10 years
1.4 Participants’ contribution rate
doubled to 12%
Indexation





Table 2: Summary of Alternative Reform Plans
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the development of the funding ratio in the 0.0 base case. The
median funding ratio (initially 75%) falls to 69% in 25 years; it
recovers slightly, to 79%, in 75 years, but there is a significant
probability of extremely low funding ratios. In the 5% worst
scenarios, the assets are completely depleted after 75 years.
The increasing underfunding leads to an increase in the
contribution rate, but this increase is too slow and too small
to counteract the trend toward underfunding.
Reform Plans (RP) 1.1 and 1.2 explore variations in the
amortization effort. The extreme case of requesting no
amortization premium at all, RP 1.1, will lead to a high
probability of default, which would effectively turn the plan
into a pay-as-you-go plan. RP 1.2, which fully recognizes the
amortization burden, appears to be effective in controlling the
solvency position: after an initial fall, the median funding ratio
recovers and gradually improves to more than full funding
at the end of the horizon. However, the 30-year amortization
period is still too long to completely rule out cases of extremely
low funding. The amortization effort can also be increased by
shortening the amortization period from 30 to 10 years; RP 1.3
shows that this measure can be very effective in limiting the
fall of the funding ratio, but it also involves high contributions
for extended periods. In RP 1.4, doubling workers’ contribution
rate from 6% to 12% has no impact on the funding ratio, as
employers decrease their contribution load such that the total
contribution level does not change, but does worsen the net
benefit position of plan participants.
In the variants discussed so far, the benefit side of the contract
remains untouched. Variants 2.1 and 2.2, which relax full
indexation, lead to higher funding ratios. The plan’s sustainability
improves considerably – the median funding ratio in both
variants surpasses 100% – but the projected benefits worsen
dramatically. After 75 years, the median pension result falls
to 25% in RP 2.1, and to 65% in RP 2.2, relative to the pension
result of the baseline plan with full indexation.5
Finally, we look at variations in the asset allocation. We consider
two corner allocations – a pure equity portfolio (RP 3.1) and
a pure fixed income portfolio (RP 3.2) – as alternatives to the
50–50 mix in the baseline. The full-equity strategy improves
the median and the upside of the funding ratio in the long run,
but the probability of default increases as well. The full bond
strategy yields no improvement at all relative to the baseline
allocation. Overall, the funding ratio is lower and the
contributions higher than in the baseline plan.
Thus, the classic ALM results suggest that without intervention,
American state and local pension plans will tend to become
financially unsustainable. The standard available policy
instrument is the amortization component in the contribution
rate. Current practices are ineffective in improving current
funding ratios: the periodic adjustments in the amortization
component are too slow and too small. Speeding up the
amortization process and addressing the full amortization
burden seem to be effective in avoiding a further fall in funding
levels, while relaxing the practice of full indexation also turns
out to be effective in improving and controlling sustainability
in the longer term.
Conditional indexation of the type employed by Dutch pension
funds is particularly effective at compressing the distribution
of funding ratios.
FR PR c
RP Description 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95%
0.0 baseline 32 69 155 100 100 100 16 20 25
1.1 0% amortization paid 15 56 144 100 100 100 16 16 16
1.2 100% amortization paid 44 79 162 100 100 100 16 21 30
1.3 amortization 10 years 52 87 170 100 100 100 16 21 34
1.4 employee contribution rate doubled 32 69 155 100 100 100 16 20 25
2.1 indexation half CPI 40 81 174 54 67 80 16 18 23
2.2 conditional indexation 45 81 148 41 69 121 16 18 22
3.1 100% stocks 24 109 493 100 100 100 16 16 26
3.2 0% stocks 21 32 49 100 100 100 23 25 26
Table 3: Classic ALM Results, 25-Year Horizon*
*Classic ALM results for 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of the funding ratio (FR), pension result (PR) and total contribution rate (c).
0.0 = baseline plan; 1.1–1.4 = alternative contribution policies; 2.1, 2.2 = alternative indexation policies; 3.1, 3.2 = alternative investment policies.
Value-Based ALM Results
The classic ALM results discussed above give us some interesting
information about how effectively alternative policies can
strengthen the financial sustainability of our pension fund.
Value-based ALM is useful for comparing different reform
plans by assigning a market value to the contingent claims
of the various stakeholders. Using the value-based ALM
approach, we can write the balance sheet of our pension plan
as shown in Figure 1.
The left side of the balance sheet states the initial assets of
the pension plan (A0) and the present value of all employer/tax
payer contributions (V0E) paid over the 75 years of evaluation.
On the right side we see the present value of the net benefit to
participants (V0P), which consists of net benefits received over
the evaluation horizon plus pension rights at the end of the
evaluation horizon that were accrued in exchange for the
contributions paid. What remains is the present value of the
plan residue (V0R), which is the difference between the present
value of the final assets at the end of the evaluation horizon
and the present value of participants’ final pension rights. By
shifting from the baseline plan to another plan, we can see
the magnitude of the shifts in plan values across the various
stakeholders.
Reform is a zero-sum game, in value terms, across the fund’s
stakeholders:
ΔV0 =−V0 – V0* is the change in value of the new plan V0
compared to the value in the baseline V0*. For example, if
taxpayer contributions to the pension fund increase, then
the value of the residue, the value of the net benefits to the
participants, or both must increase. The initial assets from the
balance sheet do not appear in this expression, as we start with
the same initial asset value under all pension plan alternatives;
the change in the value of the initial assets, therefore, is always
zero. Table 5 shows how changing the policy from baseline
(Plan 0.0) to RPs 1.1–3.2 changes the results for future plan
participants (ΔVP,Y), current plan participants (ΔVP,O ),
future taxpayers (ΔVE,Y), current taxpayers (ΔVE,O ), and
the residue of the pension fund (ΔVR), where superscripts
Y and O represent new (young) and current (old) participants
respectively. Effects are reported in billions of 2010 US
dollars; for each stakeholder, positive numbers indicate an
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FR PR c
RP Description 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95%
0.0 baseline 0 79 636 100 100 100 18 21 32
1.1 0% amortization paid 0 0 522 100 100 100 18 18 18
1.2 100% amortization paid 40 127 732 100 100 100 18 18 35
1.3 amortization 10 years 58 156 799 100 100 100 18 18 36
1.4 employee contribution rate doubled 0 79 636 100 100 100 18 21 32
2.1 indexation half CPI 33 171 917 17 25 37 18 18 26
2.2 conditional indexation 48 109 226 11 65 1580 18 18 24
3.1 100% stocks 0 356 7856 100 100 100 18 18 32
3.2 0% stocks 0 0 1 100 100 100 31 32 33
Table 4: Classic ALM Results, 75-Year Horizon*
*Classic ALM results for 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of the funding ratio (FR), pension result (PR) and total contribution rate (c).
0.0 = baseline plan; 1.1–1.4 = alternative contribution policies; 2.1, 2.2 = alternative indexation policies; 3.1, 3.2 = alternative investment policies.
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increase and negative numbers a decrease in value. Under
RPs 1.1–1.3, neither contributions by plan participants nor
indexation rules changes, so plan participants see no changes
in their value claims: ΔV0P,Y = ΔV0P,O = 0. A reduction in the
amortization payment (RP 1.1) benefits current taxpayers,
who see the amortization contribution rate fall. The value of
the final residue falls, in line with the expected deterioration
of the funding ratio over time; this also has an effect on the
future cohorts of taxpayers, who must cover the deficit
with employer support payments if assets are depleted. An
increase in the amortization payment (RP 1.2) means higher
contribution payments by taxpayers, so both young and old
taxpayers experience a loss of value. Similarly, under RP 1.3,
which shortens the amortization period, the residue value
improves, but at the cost of higher contributions by taxpayers,
who therefore see the value of their stake in the pension
arrangement fall. Doubling participants’ contribution rate
reduces the total contribution paid by taxpayers, thus shifting
value from both groups of participants to taxpayers. The
financial position of the fund is unchanged throughout;
the change in the final asset value, therefore, is zero.
Changes in indexation policy shift value across groups
of participants. By halving indexation, RP 2.1 lowers the
contract value for plan participants and thus shifts value from
participants to taxpayers, who pay smaller amortization and
employer support contributions; the long-term expected
improvement in the funding ratio and lower accrued pension
rights relative to its baseline also raise residue value of the
fund. Under RP 2.2, conditional indexation has qualitatively
similar but quantitatively larger value-shifting effects across
stakeholder groups, because there is no indexation at times
when it is most valuable and more indexation when it is less
valuable.
All pension plans discussed so far have kept the asset mix constant
at 50% fixed income and 50% equity. Changing the asset mix
changes the risk in the pension fund. Under a symmetrical
contract, this should not lead to value transfers, as higher
volatility is rewarded with higher expected returns; however,
the pension plan policy in question is not symmetrical from the
taxpayers’ perspective. When bad returns materialize, taxpayers
must cover the deficit by increased amortization and employer
support payments, but good returns do not necessarily lead to
lower contribution payments, as the contribution can never fall
below the normal cost level. That is, contribution payments are
limited on the downside but unlimited on the upside.
When riskier investments are made under RP 3.1, the upside
potential of the returns goes to the residue of the pension fund,
but the downside risk goes to the taxpayers in the form of higher
amortization and employer support payments. Therefore, we
see negative value changes for taxpayers and an increase in
residue value. When the portfolio is de-risked under RP 3.2, the
opposite occurs: a much lower downside risk of portfolio returns
results in a lower probability of high amortization support
payments, making the current generation of taxpayers better off,
but a less risky asset mix also means lower expected returns,
which produces a negative effect on the residue value. Future
cohorts of taxpayers are also hurt by lower expected returns,
as they must cover the deficit through employer support when
assets are depleted. Since neither the indexation policy nor the
participant contribution rules are changed, fund participants
are not affected by changes in portfolio composition.6
Case Description ΔV0P,Y ΔV0P,O ΔV0E,Y ΔV0E,O ΔV0R
Contribution
1.1 0% amortization paid 0 0 −394 638 −217
1.2 100% amortization paid 0 0 −1427 −1283 2676
1.3 Amortization 10 years 0 0 −2682 −2224 4828
1.4 Part. contr. rate doubled −3335 −1105 2765 1675 0
Indexation
2.1 Indexation half CPI −2453 −3065 2434 527 2570
2.2 Conditional indexation −3386 −4605 3368 778 3871
Portfolio composition
3.1 100% stocks 0 0 −250 −132 359
3.2 0% stocks 0 0 112 71 −164
Table 5: Value-Based ALM Results (US$ billion)
Table rows do not add up to exactly zero because of the limited number of stochastic runs in the valuation procedure.
The ALM calculations take 2010 as the starting year. Table 6
reports on the size of the transfers as a percentage of 2010
American GDP (US$14.6 trillion). The additional contributions
in RPs 1.2 and 1.3 would decrease value for current and future
taxpayers by 19% and 33% of 2010 GDP respectively. RP 2.2,
which produces lower benefits, amounts to a value loss of 55%
of GDP for the plan beneficiaries, while taxpayers experience
a value gain of 28% of GDP; the remaining 27% contributes to
additional underpinning of the benefit obligations coming due
after the end of the 75-years projection horizon.
Key Insights from Value-Based ALM
Analysis
Our value-based ALM analyses indicate that two measures
in particular would be effective in changing the trend of
underfunding in American state and local pension plans,
and thus producing longer-term sustainability: first, a quicker
and less limited recognition of the amortization burden in
the contribution rate; and, second, a mitigation of inflation
indexation, either by rule or by relating indexation to the
funding ratio. However, both measures lead to high transfers
of value. The more effective amortization strategy transfers
value from current taxpayers to future taxpayers on the order
of 20% to 33% of 2010 American GDP, depending on the
specific measure under consideration. The less generous
indexation variants produce net value transfers from current
and future beneficiaries to taxpayers on the order of 28% of
2010 American GDP, and to better funding of future rights
on the order of 27% of 2010 American GDP.
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Value Effects on
RP Description Taxpayers Plan Participants Benefits after 75 Years
1.1 0% amortization +2% – −2%
1.2 100% amortization −19% – +19%
1.3 Amortization 10 years −33% – +33%
1.4 Participants contribution doubled +30% −30% –
2.1 Indexation half of CPI +20% −38% +21%
2.2 Conditional indexation +28% −55% +27%
Table 6: Value Effects Expressed as a Percentage of 2010 American GDP
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Endnotes
1 We gratefully thank the Rotman International Centre for Pension
Management (ICPM) for a research grant. We also thank two anonymous
referees for their comments on the previous version of this article. The
article is based on the full report of the supported research (Lekniute et
al. 2014).
2 Under the EAN method, the employer’s annual normal cost associated
with an individual participant is calculated as a payment throughout the
projected years of service needed to finance the present value of benefits
(PVB) obligation. Because the accrued benefits due to salary growth
increase more than linearly, the method implies a component of front
loading, since the employer is pre-paying some of the benefits to be
earned in the future.
3 Under all plans, as in the baseline, we assume that indexation is always
full (i.e., negative) in the case of negative CPI inflation. This assumption
is made for ease of interpretation, as it is more intuitive to always have
a 100% pension result with the policy of full indexation to CPI. The
effective implementation of this policy may be blocked in reality,
however, especially in case of a severe benefit cut or a prolonged
period of deflation (as in Japan).
4 Future returns may well be lower than the historical returns over the past
several decades. If this is the case, then the problem of underfunding will
be even bigger than reported here.
5 In a perfect labor market with rational behavior, employer and employees
negotiate gross labor compensation equal to the present value of marginal
labor productivity, part of which may come in the form of pension promises.
When the net value of the pension promise declines, either through higher
employee contributions or through lower indexation value, rational
representatives of American state and local employees should negotiate
an offset for this loss, claiming higher wages, so that the sum of gross
wages and net value of the pension promise remains unchanged. Such a
response requires a sufficiently strong negotiating position for unions.
When state and local pension plans are in trouble, however, going for full
compensation may exacerbate the funding problem, eventually leading to
default on the part of the state or city (the example of Detroit is illustrative).
6 Lekniute et al. (2014) offers a deeper analysis of value effects, reporting
the relative value effects of changes to the plan for each stakeholder and
depicting the value consequences of contract changes for individual
cohorts of plan participants and taxpayers.
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